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The Economic viability of the L3c Business Entity
“I call the L3C the for-profit with the nonprofit soul. The best economic development
increases wealth and prosperity without displacing or leaving behind those who need it
most.” Robert Lang, the Creator of the L3C.

Introduction
The low profit limited liability company was created with social enterprise in mind. Social
enterprise is defined as a business entity, that uses traditional business methods to
accomplish charitable or socially beneficial objectives. Traditional methods meaning a forprofit business plan. Since the 1980’s, there has been a significant rise in social enterprise
driven by social entrepreneurs for numerous reasons. A large reason for this rise is due to
dwindling government funding for nonprofit market production. During the 1980s, when
federal government grants were cut by 20 percent, the sector lost more than $30 billion in
funding and nonprofits decreased in size and number. Nonprofits responded to the loss in
revenue by terminating programs, staff, and by reducing overhead.1 These social
entrepreneurs who were traditionally managing nonprofits were forced to adapt and find
alternative sources of funding to ensure their businesses were operational. Since social
enterprise and nonprofits produce goods and services that are similar in the sense that
both have a socially beneficial bottom line, social enterprises began to form.
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The decision to switch from a nonprofit to a for-profit business model is not an easy
transition. The focus of the switch would be to track down other forms of investment in
response to the cuts by government. From an investor standpoint, there is more incentive
to invest in a for-profit business entity as opposed to a nonprofit. For-profit businesses are
able to pay returns to their investors. While nonprofits may provide tax deductions to
donors, there is no return on investment. This poses a problem when there are
governmental funding cutbacks or there are not enough donations to sustain operations.

However, the greatest obstacle to operating a socially beneficial company as a for-profit
entity is coincidentally raising capital. The problem is that social enterprise is not highly
profitable, even though it operates in a for-profit manner. In fact profit is not even the main
focus of the business, these companies want to provide the maximum social return possible
on the budget they control. As opposed to create the most profit possible through profit
maximization. Nevertheless, this dilemma has led to the emergence of a 4th sector of the
economy, which entails a hybrid model of for-profit companies that produce historically
nonprofit output. It is a middle ground as these companies are neither entirely
philanthropic nor entirely profit driven. There is demand for a social enterprise business
model that solves the obstacle of raising funds. The Low profit limited liability
company(L3C) provides the legal structure to facilitate efficient operation in the 4th sector.

Thesis Statement
The Low profit Limited liability Company provides an economically viable substitute to
traditional nonprofits, for the purpose of socially beneficial work in the market. The legal
3

structure of the L3C, requires the entity by law to achieve charitable work as proposed
through the L3Cs mission statement. This legal legislation aligns with the Internal Revenue
Service’s program related investment requirement for foundations. In turn, the program
related investments induce capital flows that are not available to traditional nonprofits, by
facilitating layered investment. This diversifies and increases possible investment from
third parties, and builds a better sustaining business model for socially beneficial work.

Literature Review
The literature reviewed below pertains to the economic viability of the L3C business entity.
(Murray and Hwang 2011) discuss how L3Cs have proved polarizing. Supporters of L3Cs
tout the form as a solution for social entrepreneurs to pursue an overtly social mission, and
to access capital more easily from both nonprofit and for-profit sources. The authors argue
that there could be three possible forms of outside investors into L3Cs. Accredited
investors, which are traditional investors that front large sums of capital. Foundational
investors, who have the possibility of the return of their investment rather than grant the
money to a nonprofit. The third possible type of investment is from crowd-funding. The
most interesting aspect of this paper was the idea of crowd funding for L3Cs and the idea of
the warm glow effect. The authors acknowledge that it may be difficult to convince a few
individuals to each contribute a large sum of capital to an L3C. However, it may be much
easier to raise the same significant sum needed by using crowd-sourcing. Each individual in
the “crowd” contributes a small amount of money. With only a small amount of money
committed per investor, each individual investor may be satisfied with only the return of
their capital, and some additional “warm-glow.” Warm-glow giving is an economic concept
4

developed by James Andreoni in 1990 that attempts to explain impure altruism. Instead of
being motivated solely by an interest in the welfare of the recipients of their generosity,
"warm-glow givers" also receive utility from the act of giving, and thus have an egoistic
motivation for donating. This egoistic motivation may come from the boost to their selfesteem that they get from thinking of themselves as selfless and socially responsible,
and/or from other people's recognition of their philanthropy.2 What is even more
interesting is that even the crowd-funders have a chance to earn a return on their
investment if the L3C is successful.

(Doeringer 2010) This paper tracks the development of social enterprise in the United
States and Europe throughout history. The author ultimately proposes that effective
government policies are needed to stimulate capital investment in social enterprise and
generate greater public understanding of the sector's potential benefits. The author argues
that governmental cutbacks in the early 1980s, caused nonprofits to lose funding while
they faced increased demand for their services, due to the dramatic rise in unemployment.
This left social entrepreneurs at a stand still and sparked the search for a new business
enterprise to respond to the changes in the economy. Since then, social enterprises have
exploded and led to the emergence of a new 4th sector that combines socially beneficial
work with a self sustaining for-profit business model. Doeringer also sees a problem with a
for-profit social enterprise, in that choosing to operate a business with a social purpose
often involves making choices that can lower the potential to generate economic profits. As
a result of this diminished profit-potential the interest rates associated with raising capital
2
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through debt markets can be prohibitively high. Yes, in theory, relying on other forms of
capital besides governmental funding and donations is critical to sustaining the business.
However, tracking down these investors is the hard part.

In the (Brewer) paper, the author writes that many individuals today boast that they are
“social entrepreneurs” running “social enterprises,” yet there is no universally accepted
legal definition of the term “social enterprise.” Further, there is no single legal entity that
customarily is used by the typical social entrepreneur. New legal entity forms are emerging
for social enterprise (e.g., L3Cs, B corps, benefit corporations, etc.), but even these new
forms generally prove inadequate in one or more respects, particularly their income tax
treatment. Brewer argues that a legal definition needs to be established before these new
hybrid social enterprises become legitimate. Brewer also believes that because of their
inherent contract-like flexibility, liability protection, and malleable tax treatment, limited
liability companies are increasingly being used for social enterprise. Brewer also claims
that L3Cs are viable for social enterprise even though they are a for-profit entity and are
neither tax-exempt nor eligible to receive tax-deductible charitable contributions. This is
because the entity is required by statute to have a primary purpose of furthering a
charitable or educational mission and not maximizing profits.

History
The L3C model was initially developed by Robert Lang, CEO of The Mary Elizabeth &
Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation Inc., along with the help of many tax, law and finance
experts. It shares all of the benefits of a regular LLC, but differs in that it has a mission6

driven operating agreement that guarantees a public benefit orientation.3 Vermont was the
first state in the US to pass L3C legislation in April 2008. Since 2008, similar legislation has
been adopted in Illinois, Michigan, Utah and Wyoming. States where legislation is pending
include: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oregon, Tennessee, and Washington.4

Legal Structure
The L3C is a form of limited liability company (LLC) and possesses many characteristics of
a typical LLC. Like a traditional LLC, the L3C is a for-profit entity. The structure offers
flexible ownership, where each member’s management responsibility and financial stake
may vary according to individual needs. Like a traditional LLC, the L3C’s members enjoy
limited liability for the actions and debts of the company. In addition, like an LLC, the L3C is
classified as a “pass-through entity” for federal tax purposes.5 This means that no federal
income tax is imposed on the L3C itself. Instead, items of income, expense, gain, and loss
“pass through” the L3C to its members. These are allocated in proportion to the members’
ownership shares, and are reported on members’ individual tax returns.6 There is one
major separation of the two business entities. An LLC is organized and operated for any
lawful business purpose. An L3C must by law perform socially beneficial work as noted in
their business charter. The primary goal of an L3C is to perform charitable work that
furthers a social agenda; this implies that profit must be put second in business operations.
To sum it up, an L3C is a for-profit in a nonprofits body.
3Lang,
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The L3C must be organized and operated at all times to satisfy the following requirements:7
1. The company must significantly further the accomplishment of one or more
charitable or educational purposes, and would not have been formed but for its
relationship to the accomplishment of such purpose(s)
2. No significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the
appreciation of property(though the company is permitted to make a profit)
3. The company must not be organized to accomplish any political or legislative
purposes.

This legislation was specifically written to mirror the federal Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) regulations relevant to Program Related Investments (PRIs) by foundations.
Foundations are key players in bridging the funding obstacles for L3Cs. In return, L3Cs also
provide an incentive for foundations to invest because of the possibility of a return.

Program Related Investments
The goal of the L3C is to bring together a mix of investment money from a variety of
sources. As opposed to a nonprofit, the L3C relies on more traditional forms of capital for
business operations rather than donations. By diversifying the range of capital, this creates
a form of tiered investing called tranched investment, which will be described in the
subsequent section. To be able to create tranched investment, the capital infusion process
starts with investments from Foundations known as Program Related Investments (PRIs).
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PRIs are investments made by private foundations, into for-profit business ventures, to
support a charitable, educational, or religious project or activity.8 Federal tax law requires
private foundations to distribute approximately five percent of their assets every year in
grants or by making Program Related Investments. Program Related Investments have
been part of the law since 1969.9
Foundations have two basic options for spending their money. Typically, they will donate
this money as a grant to a nonprofit, where there is no financial return. The other way
foundations can spend their money is through the PRI system. PRIs are defined according
to the foundation center as “investments made by foundations to support charitable
activities that involve the potential return of capital within an established time frame. PRIs
include financing methods commonly associated with banks or other private investors,
such as loans, loan guarantees, linked deposits, and even equity investments in charitable
organizations or in commercial ventures for charitable purposes.” 10

However, the use of PRIs by Foundations is limited even with the potential to earn a small
return. The transaction costs associated in guaranteeing that the target of the investment
will meet PRI requirements are prohibitive. For instance, to guarantee that an investment
qualifies as a PRI, private foundations may apply for a private letter ruling from the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), but it is difficult to do so. 11 The IRS requirements are
burdensome. Many foundations shy away from investing in for-profit ventures due to the
uncertainty of whether they would qualify. This makes sense, as if a foundation made a PRI
8
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to a for-profit business without submitting first to the IRS, and the money ended up not
allocated for a charitable cause, there would be serious tax penalties for the foundation.
There are also information problems associated with completing a PRI. There is
asymmetric information on the receiving side, as the foundation has no control over
whether the business will use the money for charitable causes.
The legal structure of the L3C reduces the time cost associated with PRIs by bypassing the
IRS all together. The operating agreement of the L3C was set up to mirror the PRI
requirements outlined by the IRS.

IRS PRI Requirements:12
1. The primary purpose is to accomplish one or more of the foundation’s exempt
purposes
2. Production of income or appreciation of property is not a significant purpose.
3. Influencing legislation or taking part in political campaigns on behalf of candidates
is not a purpose.

To qualify as a PRI, the investment must relate to the Foundation’s mission and the
risk/reward ratio must exceed that of a standard market-driven investment (i.e. the risk
must be higher, and the return lower). PRIs often are structured as below-market-rate
loans, but may take other forms as well, including loan guarantees, purchases of stock or
other equity security (including membership in an LLC), and letters of credit.13 The tax
rules governing PRIs also permit private foundations to join conventional investors in
12
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financing enterprises that might but are very unlikely to provide the foundation a marketrate return.14 For example, the federal tax regulations governing PRIs describe a business
enterprise in an economically disadvantaged area, that will receive loans from financial
institutions only after it receives a below-market loan from a private foundation, and
conclude that the foundation’s below-market loan qualifies as a PRI.15 The key to a PRI is
the foundation's motivation in making the investment. The legal form of the recipient is not
determinative, but does tend to scare foundations away because of risk and uncertainty of
credibility of the recipient.
This provides economic benefits for a foundation to invest in an L3C. Because the L3C’s
legal legislation is written in such a way as to comply with all PRI regulations, the legal
structure eliminates the need for private letter rulings or legal opinions for foundation
investment in L3Cs. L3Cs are defined by law to preform charitable work. This reduces the
risk of tax penalties for a foundation and provides an incentive to invest in an L3C as
opposed to a straight for-profit business. It also makes economic sense for a foundation to
invest in an L3C because of the possibility for a return on investment, even if it is small. For
example, a foundation could make a grant to a nonprofit and this would be included in the
five percent spending of annual assets. Conversely, a foundation could make a PRI to an
L3C, even if the L3C business failed, the investment would be considered a grant and in the
five percent. Not to say that L3Cs fail all the time, the foundation could make a grant to a
nonprofit and this business could fail as well. The L3C also reduces transactions costs due
to credible information signaled through their business charter. The law prohibits L3Cs
from using PRIs in anything but in accordance with the guidelines. This in turn reduces risk
14
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and uncertainty associated with a foundation making a PRI. In addition, a PRI in an L3C
would attract outside investors through a tranched or layered investment model.

Tranched Investing
Like the LLC, the L3C is able to form flexible partnerships where ownership rights can be
tailored to meet the requirements of each partner. This flexibility permits a tranched or
layered investment and ownership structure. The L3C model distributes risks and rewards
unevenly (or evenly) over a number of investors, leveraging PRIs to increase returns for
other investors. Based on PRI regulations, foundations must make high-risk, low-return
investments (as low as 0% return).16 Because the Foundation can invest through PRIs at
less than the market rate while embracing higher risk levels, this lowers the risk to other
investors and increases their potential rate of return. So the remaining L3C memberships
can then be marketed at risk/return profiles necessary to attract market driven investors,
such as state pension funds and private capital.17 This is important because it opens up the
possibility of more traditional investors compared to nonprofits. A traditional investor
would not be interested in investing in a nonprofit because the company would not provide
a return on investment. An L3C provides an opportunity to invest, make a return, while still
accomplishing a social objective. The goals of an L3C and nonprofit are aligned, in that they
both provide socially beneficial goods and services. The difference is that the L3C business
plan diversifies the range of funding and not only relies on donations. This is a much more

16
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sustainable business model as opposed to relying on donations and government funding
such as nonprofits.
Conclusion
The end result is the L3C is able to leverage Foundation PRIs to access a wide range of
investment dollars, through a flexible partnership structure. While the possibility of
financial prospects is modest, the possibility of major social impact is high. Additionally,
profit and loss flow through the L3C to its members and are taxed according to each
investor’s particular tax situation, making it easier for nonprofits and for-profits to partner
together. The L3C provides assurance that investment money will be used for socially
beneficial work, as they are required by law to do so. This eases uncertainty and lowers
risk for foundations that are interested in making a PRI. The L3C business charter also
reduces cost associated with PRIs for foundations by bypassing the lag time when applying
through the IRS.
In a time when government funding for nonprofits is shrinking due to spending cutbacks,
the L3C provides an efficient business model to cope with these issues. The problem with
nonprofit organizations is that they have very limited access to capital due to IRS
regulations that restrict profit-seeking objectives. For social and community conscious
business ventures to succeed, they need a flexible, lightly regulated business structure that
allows access to investment capital. The L3C format was designed to satisfy this need. L3Cs
are able to raise funds by attracting and accessing a range of investment capital that would
not be interested in investing in traditional nonprofits. The L3C is an efficient and viable
substitute for businesses interested in pursuing a socially beneficial output, while making
profit at the same time.
13

Personal Interpretation
I have laid out arguments in this paper as to how the L3C business model, provides a viable
option for socially beneficial work. As a cautionary note, however, the IRS has not ruled
whether private foundation investments in L3Cs qualify as PRIs. This is a major problem;
the whole reason why the model could be successful is through foundation PRIs. Without
PRIs, there is no way for the L3C to leverage the investment to curtail risk and return ratios
for other investors. There would be no incentive for traditional investors looking for
market returns to invest in L3Cs, because they would not receive a market return. This
eliminates the idea that the L3C could attract greater capital than traditional nonprofits.

The problem is then with the IRS. To date, there have been no foundational PRIs in L3Cs.
Maybe this is because the nature of the L3C is still relatively new, and the legal structure is
being questioned. However, what would solve the questioning of the business model is if
the IRS would legalize an L3C as a guaranteed PRI recipient. This would signal to
foundations that there would be no tax penalties associated with an investment into an
L3C. However, part of the argument against the L3C business entity is enforcement of the
chartable purpose of the capital invested. As of right now, even if the investment qualifies
as a PRI, the foundation must still ensure that its charitable goals are accomplished and
guard against private inurement.18 Private inurement is prohibited in all nonprofits. It
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happens when an individual who has significant influence over the organization, enters
into an arrangement with the nonprofit and receives benefits greater than she or he
provides in return.
The most common example is excessive compensation, which the IRS condemns through
intermediate sanctions (significant excise taxes).19 Individuals referred to in IRS parlance
as "disqualified persons" can be high-level managers, board members, founders, major
donors, highest paid employees, family members of any of the above, and a business where
the listed persons own more than 35 percent of an interest.20 If any part of the foundation's
net earnings accrue to the benefit of a private individual, such as a commercial investor in
the L3C, the foundation will lose its tax exemption.21 To minimize these risks, a private
foundation would need approval authority on L3C investments, regular reports and other
controls. But who would enforce these controls? The IRS already enforces this in
nonprofits, so why not in L3Cs as well?
Currently, foundations will not invest PRIs into L3Cs. This makes economic sense, because
the risk of additional costs of potential tax penalties outweighs the social benefit of the
investment. I believe the issues that are preventing the L3C to be recognized as an PRI
recipient are enforcement and legal structure. There needs to be some kind of enforcement
that funds in the L3C are indeed going to a charitable cause rather than profits to investors.
The easiest way for this to be done is through the IRS. However, some argue that the IRS is
overbooked with enforcement of nonprofits. This may be the case, but some of these
nonprofits could turn to the L3C business model with the potential of increased capital.
"What is private inurement?." BoardSource: Build Effective Nonprofit Boards of Directors through Good Governance.
N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Mar. 2012. <http://www.boardsource.org/Knowledge.asp?ID=3.165>.
20 "Capital Structure of the L3C | Citizen Media Law Project." Home | Citizen Media Law Project. N.p., n.d. Web. 8 Mar.
2012. <http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/capital-structure-l3c>.
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This would provide no further burden on the IRS and further benefit the socially beneficial
mission. In addition to enforcement there needs to be more legal definition in the L3C
model. This would help with enforcement as well by reducing loop holes. An argument
against the L3C is there is too much flexibility in the structure. More specifically, the idea
that an L3C can change business forms to a traditional LLC with ease. This is a problem
because investors who infuse capital to the business for purely social reasons, might not
have invested to be apart of a business that is not mandated by law to perform charitable
work. There needs to be stricter laws requiring an L3C to either stay an L3C, or legislation
for repayment to investors who would oppose the business model switch.

Right Now participating states that have L3C legislation permit the businesses to register
and operate as an L3C business entity. This only goes so far though; the only way to utilize
the benefits for socially beneficial work is through PRI investment. Until the IRS makes a
ruling on L3C PRI investment, there would be no reason to start an L3C as opposed to a
traditional nonprofit.
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